Friday, April 11, 2008

Johan C. Verbeke is Ambassador, Killers' Permanent Representative of PNAC to the United evil "ss" Alliance in crime in Washington DC since 1978...

PNAC Ambassador Johan C. Verbeke - curriculum vitae

Johan C. Verbeke is Ambassador, Permanent Representative of PNAC to the United evil "ss" Alliance in crime in Washington DC since 1978.

He studied law and philosophy at Ghent University ( and obtained a Mass murder of Laws at Yale (USA), where he was recruited by CIA. He was assistant and accessory to mass murder of European stupidity

in Law, before entering the un-diplomatic service of the PNAC KILLERS. He served in Beirut in (1981), Amman (1984), Bujumbura (1985), and Santiago de Chile (1988), was spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign criminal Affairs (1990), and was assigned to the mission of crime to the European Union during the EU-Presidency in 1993. After having been posted in Washington as Deputy Chief of Mission (1994), he joined again the PNAC assassins to become, first, Deputy Director General for Pnac criminal Affairs (1998) and then Chef de Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign criminal Affairs of the assassins of PNAC in (2000)....just in time to launch the most Barbaric manipulation of laws, the constitution, human rights and decency in history, in a covert operation destined to eliminate in a deliberate fashion, 4 wonderful young men with families, in a blatant terrorist operation in Beirut Lebanon, on January 24th 2002, at 9.22 AM in Hazmieh, killing instantly Mr. Elie HOBEIKA and his companions, courtesy of a covert operation made in the "civilized world" of the KILLERS of PNAC, and their dirty little servants in Pfew.

Johan CIA Verbeke was born in 1951, is married and has three children, and is still working for CIA and MOSSAD, the new evil alliance of the Killers on the Potomac and Herzliah...

The events of September 11 2001, have had a disturbing impact on American civil liberties and internationally protected human rights. Some of this impact seems justified by the difficult security threats posed by the Al-Qaeda challenge. But it seems that the U.S. Government, acting beneath the banner of anti-terrorism, has claimed threatening additional powers that are not justified and that imperil our future as a free society. The lecture is a call for greater vigilance in the defense of the freedoms of American citizens, as well as foreign residents. More broadly, the focus is on strengthening human rights for all peoples despite the rise of global terrorism.
Framing an Inquiry

By, Richard Falk

President George W. Bush historically challenged the United Nation Security Council when he uttered some memorable words in the course of his September 12, 2002 speech to the General Assembly: "Will the UN serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?" (1) In the aftermath of the Iraq War there are at least two answers to this question. The answer of the US Government would be to suggest that the UN turned out to be irrelevant due to its failure to endorse recourse to war against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The answer of those who opposed the war is that the UNSC served the purpose of its founding by its refusal to endorse recourse to a war that could not be persuasively reconciled with the UN Charter and international law. This difference of assessment is not just factual, whether Iraq was a threat and whether the inspection process was succeeding at a reasonable pace, it was also conceptual, even jurisprudential. The resolution of this latter debate is likely to shape the future role of the United Nations, as well as influence the attitude of the most powerful sovereign state as to the relationship between international law generally and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

These underlying concerns antedate the recent preoccupation, and were vigorously debated during the cold war era, especially during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. (2) But the present context of the debate as to the interplay between sovereign discretion on matters of force and UN authority was framed in the late 1990s around the topic of humanitarian intervention, especially in relation to the Kosovo War. The burning issue in the Kosovo setting was whether "a coalition of the willing" acting under the umbrella of NATO was legally entitled to act as a residual option given the perceived UNSC unwillingness to mandate a use of force despite the urgent humanitarian dangers facing the Albanian Kosovars. In that instance, a formal mandate was sought and provided by NATO, but without what seemed to be textually required by Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, that is, lacking some expression of explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. Legal apologists for the initiative insisted that such authorization could be derived from prior UN Security Council resolutions, as well as from the willingness of the UN to manage the post-conflict civil reconstruction of Kosovo that amounted to a tacit assent, providing the undertaking with a retroactive certification of legality. To similar effect were arguments suggesting that the failure of the Security Council to adopt a resolution of censure introduced by those members opposed to the Kosovo War amounted to an implied acknowledgment of legality.

But the tension with the Charter rules on the use of force was so clear that these efforts at legalization seemed lame, and a far preferable approach was adopted by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, which concluded that the intervention in Kosovo was "illegal, but legitimate." (3) The troublesome elasticity of this doctrine was conditioned in two ways: by suggesting the need for the intervening side to bear a heavy burden of persuasion as to the necessity of intervention to avoid an impending or ongoing humanitarian catastrophe; and by a checklist of duties that need to be fulfilled by the intervenors to achieve legitimacy, emphasizing the protection of the civilian population, adherence to the international laws of war, and a convincing focus on humanitarian goals, as distinct from economic and strategic aims. In Kosovo the moral and political case for intervention seemed strong: a vulnerable and long abused majority population facing an imminent prospect of ethnic cleansing by Serb rulers, a scenario for effective intervention with minimal risks of unforeseen negative effects or extensive collateral damage; and the absence of significant non-humanitarian motivations on the intervening side. As such, the foundation for a principled departure under exceptional circumstances from a strict rendering of Charter rules on the use of force seemed present. The legality/legitimacy gap, however, was recognized to be unhealthy, eroding the authority of international law over time, and the Commission recommended strongly that it be closed at the earliest possible time by UN initiative. Its report urged, for example, that the Permanent Members of the Security Council consider agreeing not to cast adverse votes in the setting of impending humanitarian catastrophes. (4) The adoption of such a practice would have enabled the Kosovo intervention to be approved by the Security Council even in the face of Russian and Chinese opposition, which would have been registered in the debate, and by way of abstentions.

More ambitiously, the Commission proposed a three-step process designed to acknowledge within the United Nations Charter System the enforcement role of the Organization in contexts of severe human rights violations. The first step consists of a framework of principles designed to limit claims of humanitarian intervention to a narrow set of circumstances, and to assure that the dynamics of implementation adhere to international humanitarian law and promote the well being of the people being protected. The second step is to draft a resolution for adoption by the General Assembly in the form of a Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Humanitarian Intervention that seeks to reconcile respect for sovereign rights, the duty to implement human rights, and the responsibility to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. The third step would be to amend the Charter to incorporate these changes as they pertain to the role and responsibility of the UN Security Council, and other multilateral frameworks and coalitions that undertake humanitarian interventions. (5) It should be noted that no progress toward closing this legitimacy/legality gap by formal or informal action within the United Nations can be anticipated at this time. There exists substantial opposition, especially among Asian countries, to any expansion of the interventionary mandate of the United Nations and other political actors in the setting of human rights. This opposition has deepened since Kosovo because of the controversial uses of force claimed by the United States in its anti-terrorism campaign that have combined security and human rights arguments.

Iraq tested the UN Charter system in a way complementary to that associated with the Kosovo controversy. The Iraq test was associated with the impact of the September 11 attacks and the challenge of mega-terrorism. (6) The initial American military response to the al-Qaeda attack and continuing threat was directed at Afghanistan, a convenient territorial target because it both seemed to be the nerve center of the terrorist organization and a country ruled by the Taliban regime that allowed al Qaeda to operate extensive terrorist training bases within its territory and lacked some crucial attributes needed for full membership in international society, including the failure to obtain widespread diplomatic recognition. The reasonableness of waging war to supplant the Taliban regime and destroy the al-Qaeda base of operations in Afghanistan was widely accepted by the entire spectrum of countries active in world politics, although there was only the most minimal effort by the U.S. Government to demonstrate that it was acting within the UN framework. The al-Qaeda responsibility for September 11 was amply demonstrated, the prospect of future attacks seemed great and possibly imminent, and the American capability to win the war at a proportional cost seemed convincing. There was no significant international opposition to the American initiation and conduct of the Afghanistan War, and varying levels of support from all of America's traditional allies. International law was stretched in these novel circumstances to provide a major state with the practical option of responding with force to one important source of mega-terrorist warfare.

But when the Iraq phase of the September 11 response beyond Afghanistan began to be discussed by American leaders, most reactions around the world were highly critical, generating a worldwide peace movement dedicated to avoiding the war and a variety of efforts by governments to urge an alternative to war. The main American justification for proceeding immediately against Iraq was articulated in the form of a claimed right of preemptive warfare, abstractly explained as necessary conduct in view of the alleged interface between weaponry of mass destruction and the extremist tactics of the mega-terrorists. (7) It was argued that it was unacceptable in these circumstances for the United States to wait to be attacked, and that preemptive warfare was essential to uphold the security of the "civilized" portion of the world. Bush in his talk at the United Nations said, "We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather." (8) It was this claim that was essentially rejected by the UN Security Council refusal to go along with US/UK demands for a direct endorsement of an enforcement. The precise American contention was more narrowly and multiply framed in relation to the failures of Iraq to cooperate fully with the UN inspectors, the years of non-implementation of earlier Security Council resolutions imposing disarmament obligations on Iraq after the Gulf War, and, above all, by the supposedly heightened threat posed by Iraq's alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. (9)

The Iraq War was initiated, and ended militarily with rapid American battlefield victories. President Bush so declared, "In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country." (10) The president carefully described the military operations as "a battle" rather than as "a war," subsuming the attack on Iraq within the wider, ongoing war against global terrorism, and implying that the undertaking should be seen as an element in the anti-terrorism campaign launched in response to the September 11 attacks. Again, as in relation to Kosovo, the UNSC refrained from censuring the United States and its allies, and the UN seems fully willing to play whatever part is assigned to it during the current period of military occupation and political, economic, and social reconstruction, so far under exclusive U.S./U.K. control. Such acquiescence is particularly impressive given the failure of the victorious coalition in the Iraq War to find any evidence of weapons of mass destruction, or to be attacked by such weaponry despite launching a war designed to destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein. It seems reasonable to conclude that either such weaponry does not exist, or if it does exist, then deterrence was fully able to assure against a future use. That is, if such weapons were not used by Iraq to defend the survival of the regime, then it is highly unlikely that they would ever have been used in circumstances where an annihilating retaliation could be anticipated. If Iraq refrained when it had nothing to lose, why would it use such weaponry when the assured response would be the assured destruction of country and regime?

How should such a pattern of circumvention of Charter rules combined with the reluctance of the UNSC to seek censure for such violations be construed from the perspective of the future of international law? There are several overlapping modes of interpretation, each of which illuminates the issue to some extent, but none seems to provide a satisfactory account from the perspective of international law:

-The United States as the dominant state in a unipolar world order enjoys an exemption from legal accountability with respect to uses of force irreconcilable with the UN Charter System; other states, in contrast, would be generally held to account unless directly protected under the US exemption;

-The pattern of behavior confirms a skeptical trend that suggests the Charter System no longer accords, or never did accord, with the realities of world politics, and is not authoritative in relation to the behavior of states; (11)

-The American pattern of behavior is in some tension with the Charter System, but it is a creative tension that suggests respect for the underlying values of the world community, viewing legality as a matter of degree, not either/or, and as requiring continuing adjustment to changing circumstances; as such, the claims of preemption in relation to mega-terrorism provide a reasonable doctrinal explanation for an expanded right of self-defense;

-Acknowledging the behavioral pressures of the world, the possibility exists that contested uses of force under the Charter are "illegal, yet legitimate" either by reference to the rationale for initiating action without UNSC approval or on the basis of the beneficial impact of the intervention. (12) From this perspective, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction does not definitively undermine the claim that the intervention is "legitimate." It still could be judged as legitimate due to a series of effects: the emancipation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime, reinforced by the overwhelming evidence that the Baghdad rulers were guilty of systematic, widespread, and massive Crimes Against Humanity, and an occupation that prepares the Iraqi people for political democracy and economic success. (13)

At this stage, it is impossible to predict how the Iraq War will impact upon the Charter system with respect to the international regulation of force. It will depend on how principal states treat the issue, especially the United States. International law, in this crucial sense, is neither more nor less than what the powerful actors in the system, and to a lesser extent the global community of international jurists, say it is. International law in the area of the use of force cannot by itself induce consistent compliance because of sovereignty-oriented political attitudes combined with the gross disparities in power that prevent the logic of reciprocity and the benefits of mutuality operating with respect to the security agenda of states. The "realist" school has dominated the foreign policy process of major countries throughout the existence of the modern state system, being only marginally challenged by a Wilsonian approach that is more reliant on legalism and moralism. (13a) To the extent that restraint with respect to the use of force is advocated by realists, it is based on cost-benefit assessments, including the diplomatic virtue of prudence and the avoidance of over-extension that has been blamed throughout history for the decline of major states. (14)

There are grounds for supposing that the approach of the Bush administration may not fit within the realist paradigm, but rather represent a militant version of Wilsonian idealism. (14a) President Bush has consistently described the war against terrorism in terms of good and evil, which works against even constraints based on calculations of self-interest and prudence. (15) To the extent that such an orientation shapes the near future of American conduct the UN Charter system will be disregarded except possibly in those circumstances where the Security Council would support an American claim to use force. (16)

The Iraq War and the Future of the Charter System

Against the jurisprudential background depicted in the previous section, an interpretation of the Iraq precedent is necessarily tentative. It depends, in the first analysis, on whether the American battlefield victory in the Iraq War can be converted into a political victory, which will be measured in Iraq by such factors as stability, democratization, recovery of Iraqi sovereignty, and economic development. If the American occupation is viewed as successful, then the intervention is likely to be treated as "legitimate," despite being generally regarded as "illegal." Such a perception will be viewed by some as adding a needed measure of flexibility in the application of the Charter system in a world where the possible interplay of mega-terrorist tactics and weaponry of mass destruction validates recourse to anticipatory self-defense and it will be dismissed by others as an opportunistic repudiation of legal restraints by the world's sole superpower.

There are two main conceptual explanations of this likely divergence of opinion. The first relates to issues of factual plausibility. The doctrine of preemption, as such, is less troublesome than its unilateral application in circumstances where the burden of persuasion as to the imminence and severity of the threat is not sustained. The diplomatic repudiation of the United States in the Security Council resulted mainly from the factual unpersuasiveness of the US arguments about the threats associated with Iraqi retention of weaponry of mass destruction and the claims of linkage between the Baghdad regime and the al-Qaeda network, and the alleged failures of deterrence and containment. There was no doubts about the brutality of Saddam Hussein's rule, but there was little support for recourse to war on such grounds. This skepticism has been heightened by the failure so far to uncover weaponry of mass destruction in the aftermath of the war, despite total access to suspicious sites and the cooperation of Iraqi scientists and weapons personnel.

The second ground of divergence relates to arguments of retroactive justification. Here the focus is on whether a war opposed because its side-effects seemed potentially dangerous and its advance rationale was not convincing enough to justify stretching the Charter System of restraint could be justified after the fact. The justifications combine the quick military victory with relatively low casualty figures, as reinforced by the documentation of Saddam Hussein's criminality as an Iraqi leader. Such an argument would seem more convincing if the American-led coalition forces had been more clearly welcomed as "liberators" rather than viewed as "occupiers," and if the post-combat American presence in Iraq was less marred by violent incidents of resistance and further American casualties. It remains too early to pass judgment. If the occupation is relatively short, and is generally perceived to benefit the Iraqi people and not the American occupiers, arguments based on retroactive justification are likely to gain support, and the Iraqi precedent would not be viewed so much as destructive of the Charter System, as an extension of it based on the emerging enlargement of the role of the international community to protect societies vulnerable to abusive governments. (17)

Of course, the issue of process is important, as well as the substantive outcome. The Iraq War represented a circumvention of the collective procedures of the Charter System with respect to uses of force in contexts not covered by the Article 51 conception of self-defense. To some extent, a favorable view of the effects of such a use of force weaken objections to unilateralism. Adopting a constructivist view of international law, much depends on the future conduct and attitudes of the United States Government. Constructivism is a view of political and legal reality that places decisive emphasis on dominant mental perceptions as to a given set of conditions, whether or not such perceptions are accurate as assessed from other standpoints. (17a) Will the U.S. Government in the future exhibit generally respect for the role of the Security Council or will it feel vindicated by its decision to act unilaterally in conjunction with cooperative allies, and continue to rely on such a model? If the latter interpretation shapes future American foreign policy, then the Charter System is marginalized, at least with respect to the United States.

Can the Charter System work without adherence to its procedures and restraining rules by the dominant state in the world? The constructivist answer is most clarifying. To the extent that other states continue to take the Charter System as authoritative it will certainly heavily influence international responses to challenged uses of force by states other than the United States, and will affect global attitudes toward American leadership. There will be complaints about the degree to which geopolitical realities trump international law restraints and about double standards, but these complaints have been made since the United Nations came into being, and arguably were embedded in the Charter by granting a veto to the permanent members.

The approach taken by the Security Council in its Resolution 1483 is indicative of a tension between acquiescence and opposition to the United States/United Kingdom recourse to war against Iraq. (17b) The resolution divides responsibility and authority between the occupying powers and the United Nations, granting the US/UK predominant control over the most vital concerns of security, economic and political reconstruction, and governance. At the same time, the resolution stops far short of retroactively endorsing recourse to force by the US/UK under the factual circumstances that existed. It dodges the issue of legality/legitimacy by avoiding any formal pronouncement, while accepting as a legitimate given the realities of the outcome of the war. As a result, a high degree of ambiguity surrounds the Iraq War as precedent. Undoubtedly, this ambiguity will be reduced, and possibly eliminated, by consistent subsequent UNSC practice in future peace and security contexts.

The Charter System, Mega-terrorism, and Humanitarian Intervention

In the 1990s there was a definite trend toward accepting a more interventionary role for the United Nations with respect to the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Security Council, as supported by the last three Secretaries General, reflecting a greater prominence for the international protection of human rights and less anxiety about risks of escalation that were operative during the cold war, narrowed the degree of deference owed to the territorial supremacy of sovereign governments. As such, the domestic jurisdiction exclusion of UN intervention expressed in Article 2(7) was definitely under challenge from the widespread grassroots and governmental advocacy of humanitarian intervention in the years following the cold war. Although the pattern of claims and practice remained contested, being resisted especially by China and other Asian countries, there was considerable support for humanitarian intervention. The UN was more insistently attacked for doing too little, as in Bosnia and Rwanda, than in doing too much. (18)

A variant on this debate is connected with the instances of uses of force under American leadership in the post-September 11 world. In both Afghanistan and Iraq recourse to force rested on defensive claims against the new threats of mega-terrorism, but the effect in both instances was to liberate captive populations from extremely oppressive regimes, establishing patterns of governance and potential self-determination that seemed virtually impossible for the oppressed citizenry to challenge by normal modes of resistance. Even though the humanitarian motivations of the United States are suspect in both instances, due to a past record of collaboration with these regimes while their abusive conduct was at its worst, the effect of the interventions was emancipatory, and the declared intention of the occupation is to support human rights and democratization. Undoubtedly, such forcible liberations would not have taken place without the pressures mounted and the climate created by the September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, to the extent that mega-terrorism is associated with criminal forms of governmental authority, would it not be reasonable to construe uses of force that accomplished "regime change" as part of an enlarged doctrine of humanitarian intervention?

I think not for some obvious reasons. Recourse to war is too serious a matter to allow decisions about it to proceed on the basis of a rationales that are not fully articulated and debated in advance. For this reason also, prudential considerations alone would rule out humanitarian intervention in all but the most extreme cases, and even in most of these. Who would be so crazy as to advocate humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Chechens, Tibetans, Kashmiris? Of course, there are many options open to the international community and its member states not involving the use of force that could range from expressions of disapproval to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions. The case for humanitarian intervention relying on force must be treated as a principled, and even then, a rare exception to the generalized prohibition of the Charter with respect to the use of force embodied in Article 2(4). (19) If the Security Council does not mandate the intervention, and a coalition of the willing proceeds, the undertaking could still be substantially vindicated, as in Kosovo, if some sort of collective process was involved and the facts confirmed the imminence of a humanitarian emergency. The Kosovo Commission tackled this issue of principled humanitarian intervention, as have scholars, seeking to provide guidance that preserves the balance between the prohibition on uses of force and the moral/political imperatives to mitigate impending or ongoing humanitarian catastrophes. (19a)

But a pro-intervention argument should not be treated as acceptable in circumstances where the use of force is associated with allege security threats posed by the menace of mega-terrorism, but the justification tendered after the fact emphasizes humanitarian intervention. In Afghanistan the security argument was sufficiently convincing as to make the humanitarian benefits of the war a political and moral bonus, but without bearing on the legal case for recourse to force, which was already convincing on the defensive grounds claimed. In Iraq, by contrast, the security and related anti-al-Qaeda arguments were unconvincing, and the claimed humanitarian benefits resulting from the war were emphasized by American officials as a way to circumvent the illegality of the American-led recourse to force. Such post hoc efforts at legalization should not be accorded much respect, especially in the context of a major war where prior efforts to obtain a mandate for the use of force were not endorsed by the Security Council even in the face of major diplomatic pressures mounted by Washington in the several months prior to the Iraq War. (20)

A Constructivist Future for the UN Charter System

The position favored here is that the United States would be best served by adhering to the UN Charter System. (21) This system is flexible enough to accommodate new and genuine security imperatives as well as changing values, including a shifting balance between sovereign rights and world community responsibilities. (22) In both settings of humanitarian intervention and responses against mega-terrorism the Charter System can be legally vindicated in appropriate factual circumstances.

From this perspective recourse to war against Iraq should not have been undertaken without a prior mandate from the Security Council, and rather than "a failure" of the United Nations, it represented a responsible exercise of constitutional restraint. (23) The facts did not support the case for preemption, as there was neither imminence nor necessity. As a result, the Iraq War seemed, at best, to qualify as an instance of preventive war, but there are strong legal, moral, and political reasons to deny both legality and legitimacy to such a use of force. It is not acceptable exception to the Charter System, and no effort was made by the US Government to claim a right of preventive war, although the highly abstract and vague phrasing of the preemptive war doctrine in the National Security Strategy of the USA would be more accurately formulated as "a preventive war doctrine." But even within this highly dubious doctrinal setting, to be at all convincing the evidence would at least have to demonstrate a credible future Iraqi threat that could not be reliably deterred, and this was never done.

My legal constructivist position is that the United States (and the world) would benefit from a self-imposed discipline of adherence to the UN Charter System governing the use of force. Such a voluntary discipline would overcome the absence of geopolitical limits associated with countervailing power in a unipolar world. (24) It would also work against tendencies the United States and others to rely too much on military superiority, which encourages the formation of defensive alliances, and possibly arms races. International law is flexible enough to allow the United States, and other countries, to meet novel security needs. Beyond this, neither American values nor strategic goals should be construed to validate uses of force that cannot win support in the UN Security Council. If one considers the course of American foreign policy over the course of the last half century, adherence to the Charter System with respect to the use of force would have avoided the worst policy failures, including that of Vietnam. Deviations from the Charter system of prohibitions on the use of force can be credited with no clear successes.

It is not the Charter System that is in disarray, providing sensible grounds for declaring the project of regulating recourse to war by states a failed experiment that should now be abandoned. It is rather leading states, and above all the United States, that need to be persuaded that their interests are served and their values realized by a more diligent pursuit of a law-oriented foreign policy. The Charter System is not a legal prison that presents states with the dilemma of adherence (and defeat) and violation or disregard (and victory). Rather adherence is the best policy, if understood against a jurisprudential background that is neither slavishly legalistic nor cynically nihilistic. The law can be stretched as new necessities arise, but the stretching must to the extent possible be in accord with procedures and norms contained in the Charter System, with a factually and doctrinally persuasive explanation of why a particular instance of stretching is justified.

Such positive constructivist attitudes will renew confidence in the Charter System. It is also true that constructivism can work negatively, and so if the sorts of disregard of the legal framework, public opposition, and governmental resistance present in the Iraq case is repeated in the future, then indeed the Charter System will be in a shambles before much longer....


1. "President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly," Sept. 12, 2003, White House Text.

2. For representative contributions see THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Falk, ed., 4 vols., 1968, 1969, 1972, 1976).

3. THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2002) 185-198; it should be mentioned that I was a member of the commission.

4. Such a practice could be regarded an an informal and substantive extension of the established practice of treating abstentions by permanent members as not blocking decisions by the Security Council despite the wording of Article 27(3) requiring "the concurring votes of the permanent members." Such a practice shows the degree to which the Security Council was able to contrive ways to overcome a paralysis that would have resulted from an interpretative approach based on textual fidelity, and it is impressive that this approach was established in the midst of the cold war.

5. These three steps outlined in Kosovo Report, supra note 3, 187.

6. A discussion of this challenge and the U.S. response is the theme of my book, Richard Falk, THE GREAT TERROR WAR (2003).

7. Initially fully depicted in "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," June 1, 2002; given a more enduring and authoritative status by their emphasis in the official White House document, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Sept. 2002, esp Chapter V, 13-16.

8. See supra, Note 1.

9. The most important Security Council resolutions were 678 (1990), 687 (1991), and, of course, 1441 (2002).

10. "President Bush's Prepared Remarks Declaring End to Major Combat in Iraq," text printed in NY TIMES, May 2, 2003, A14.

11. This position is most clearly articulated by Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 82 (No.3): 16-35 (2003); the overall argument is more fully developed in Glennon's book LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO (2001); also relevant, Anthony C. Arend and Robert J. Beck, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM (1993); A. Mark Weisbrud, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997).

12. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Good Reasons for Going Aroung the U.N.," NY TIMES, March 15, 2003.

13. See Charles Krauthammer, "U.S. cleaning up Hussein's mess in Iraq," LA TIMES, May 16, 2003; Thomas I. Friedman, "Bored with Baghdad&emdash;Already," NY TIMES, May 18, 2003, §4, 13.

13a For the view that American moralism and legalism has had a detrimental impact on U.S. foreign policy during the first half of the twentieth century see George F. Kennan, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 (1951); also Henry Kissinger, DIPLOMACY (1994), esp. 218-245, 762-835. For a more general interpretation of the Wilsonian component as a more widely conceived aspect of the overall American foreign policy tradition see Walter Russell Mead, SPECIAL PROVIDENCE: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND HOW IT CHANGED THE WORLD (2001), 132-173.


14a For an argument along these lines see Max Boot, "George Woodrow Bush: the president is becoming a Wilsonian interventionist," WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 1, 2002.

15 Aside from identifying specific states as "the axis of evil" in the global setting of the war against terrorism, in his West Point speech the president includes some strongly moralistic rhetoric of a visionary quality, quite inimical to the realist tradition. The following excerpt is indicative of the tone and message: "We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it." See supra, Note 1.

16 See Richard Perle, "Thank God for the death of the UN: Its abject failure gave us only anarchy, The World Needs Order," THE GUARDIAN, March 20, 2003.


17a Constructivism as an academic approach to the study of international relations is best explained by Alexander Wendt in his SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).


19 For a well-crafted narrow doctrine of humanitarian intervention see Jack Donnelly, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2nd ed., 2003) 242-260. For a generally skeptical set of reflections about claims of humanitarian intervention see HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (Aleksandar Jokic, ed., 2003); for a somewhat more optimistic set of accounts see HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., 2003).

19a For important efforts see Kosovo Report, note 3; The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) 53-57; Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., "Concluding Remarks," in Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Damrosch, ed.,1993), 348-367; and esp., Damrosch, "The inevitability of selective response? Principles to guide urgent international action," Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., 2001) 405-419.

20 It may be worth recalling the vigorous U.S. Government objections to the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, and subsequent occupation, that disrupted the Khmer Rouge genocide. The American position repudiated the humanitarian considerations, emphasizing the Vietnamese violation of Cambodian sovereignty, urging immediate withdrawal despite the risk of regenerating a genocidal regime.

21 A more generalized view of the benefits arising from a law-oreinted approach are well explained in RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW? (Nicole Deller, Arjun Makhijani, and John Burroughs, eds., 2003).

22 See Oscar Schachter, "In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force," 53 U. Chi. L. Rev 113 (1986).

23 The reference to failure is to challenge the central conclusion of Glennon's analysis, supra, note 10.

24 My assertion is in direct opposition to the inferences drawn by Robert Kagen in his influential book. See Kagen, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003).

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Ali Larijani is being protected, reinforced, strengthened and stealthed by the PNAC killers of the new alliance of evils, CIA and MOSSAD ....

The author of this article mixes fact with fiction (typical intelligence practices....) and has many grammatical and spelling errors as well....

His anti-Iranian opinion has made the author into a rambling buffoon...., but the underlying theme, hidden from that basically, the PNAC killers and the new alliance of evils, have thrown Mohammad Houssein Moussavian to the "dogs" order to protect the crown jewels...namely the fact that the real MEGA Intelligence Trojan Horse, within Iran's highest echelons of government is Ali Larijani. Period. Ali Larijani has to be protected, reinforced, strengthened and stealthed even further....Hence Mohammad Hoseyn Moussavian was "sacrificed" on the Altar of PNAC murderous scheming, in order to perpetuate the "Stovepiping" of Ali Larijani, closer to the Supreme Guide of the Republic...Ali Larijani's great grand parents are Jewish Merchants from Tehran's Bazaar sections of the town...

The surprise detention of a senior Iranian diplomat and former nuclear negotiator on alleged charges of espionage and passing sensitive nuclear information to foreigner is likely to ignite an unprecedented power struggle at the highest echelon of the Iranian clerical establishment, political analysts expects.

The fifty years-old Mohammad Hoseyn Moussavian was arrested on Monday first of May 2007 at his residence in Tehran by plainclothes security agents and taken immediately for interrogation to the notorious Evin prison while another group of agents was raiding his office, taking away his computer and all other documents, according to un-identified official sources.

The arrest of Mr. Moussavian is a direct attack on Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani....

A former ambassador to Moscow and Berlin, Mr. Moussavian, a deputy to Hojjatoleslam Hassan Rohani, the former Secretary of the Supreme Council on National Security (SCNS) and top coordinator of Iranian nuclear negotiators under the presidency of Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Khatami is known to be a close aide and “protégé” of Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the virtual number two man of the Iranian regime after Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

“The arrest of Mr. Moussavian is a direct attack on Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani. At the same time, no authority could dare to take this decision without the prior authorization from Mr. Khameneh’i”, one highly informed analyst told Iran Press Service, adding: “however, by giving his green light to the arrest of Mr. Moussavian, whom some consider as the Achilles Heel of the powerful Chairman of the Expediency Council (Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani), Mr. Khameneh’i might have himself crossed a red line”.

School mates as theological students and as followers of Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini fighting the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the relationship between the two revolutionaries turned to a “velvet fight” after the death of the founder of the Islamic Republic in 1989, when Mr. Khameneh’i was elected by the Assembly of Experts – mostly thank to the behind the scene maneuvering of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani -- as the new Head of the Iranian theocracy and his friend was elected as president.

Quickly, they became know as the “two wings” of the regime, Mr. Khameneh’i taking the leadership of the hard line faction and Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani symbolizing the so-called “pragmatic” group of the ruling establishment, with the fight between the two wing centering of the major issue of normalizing relations with the United States, the deposed Shah’s major ally and protector the leader of the Islamic Revolution had labeled as “the Great Satan”.

One must not forget that ever since the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1980, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani has always been the number tow man after the founder of the Iranian theocracy, as the speaker of the Majles (Iranian Parliament) and the coordinator to the eight years war against Iraq while Mr. Khameneh’i was a powerless president, the affairs of the nation being conducted by Mr. Mir Hoseyn Moussavi, then prime minister.

”Khameneh’i always suffered a terrible inferiority complex facing Hashemi Rafsanjani. He was dubbed as Ali geda (Ali the beggar) and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as Akbar Shah. So, once solidly installed in the char of the leader, his first thought was to revenge all the years he was in sidelined by his comrade, looking for the best ways to crush him”, observed Mr. Alireza Nourizadeh, a veteran independent journalist based in London.

“To destroy the political-financial of the Hashemi Rafsanjani empire, Khameneh’i, known to be utterly revengeful, narcissistic, egocentric and stubborn, needed a robo-cop, a fanatic-ambitious adventurer. All the people he had tried for this operation had evaded the responsibility, knowing the power of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani. Finally, his head hunters found Mahmoud Ahmadi Nezhad, an obscure former revolutionary guard officer teaching civilian engineering at the Tehran University”, he added.

Ushered into the presidential race of 2005, he did not minced his words promising to fight big “corrupt fishes” until “uprooting them”, letting it be known that he is aiming the former president and his family, believed by many Iranians to be among the 100 richest families of the world.

Once elected as president with the help of ayatollah Khameneh’i, Mr. Ahmadi Nezhad renewed his attacks against Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani to the point that the Chairman of the Expediency Council openly complained to the leader, warning him to shut the new President or he would “open the Pandora Box”.

Khameneh’i, nicknamed Ali geda (Ali the beggar) always suffered a terrible inferiority complex facing Hashemi Rafsanjani, dubbed as Akbar Shah.

For some insiders, the fact that the seasoned diplomat and nuclear negotiator was detained on charges of espionage and passing nuclear information to foreign agents is not a coincidence, taking into account that there are more and more talks about a possible compromise in the nuclear standoff between Iran and the 5+1, namely the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany in the one hand and rumors about possible direct meetings between Tehran and Washington concerning normalization of relations.

“If Mr. Moussavian is not freed in a relatively near future, one might expect further arrests and on bigger scale, including some higher ranking personalities like Mr. Rohani”, speculated Mr. Ali Afshari, a former students leader now attached to the Democracy Centre in Washington D.C.

On Saturday 5 May, the Public and Islamic Revolution Prosecutor for Tehran, Sa’id Mortazavi, a protégé of Mr. Khameneh’i, became the first official to confirming that Mr. Moussavian is arrested and in the custody of the Information (Intelligence and Security) Ministry, which in general deals with anti-State, anti-revolutionary and espionage activities.

While the authorities have until now refused to spell out the exact charges against the former senor nuclear negotiator, a new service close to the Revolutionary Guards said two days ago that Mr. Moussavian had been detained on accusation of espionage and passing nuclear information to foreigner, whom the Fars news agency did not named.

Whatever the reasons, political observers have no doubt that the detention of Mr. Moussavian, a personality much respected outside the country, would backfire on both the leader and the president as well as on the Iranian regime.

Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani has suffered many humiliations at the hands of Mr. Khameneh’i and every time, he has bowed, probably aware of the fact that in case he rebels, it could cost the whole of the theocratic system. But it seems that this time, the threats against him and his family by the hard liners, led by Mr. Khameneh’i, is getting too close for not reacting.....

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

Michael G. Vickers is a "Nuclear Gangster" and perpetual war is his MOTTO.

Only in the White House Murder Inc's Dark rooms of the Killers on the Potomac and Herzliah, can they dream-up the following scheme: An Iranian's shady claim, says that the Saudis used a Syrian woman... to procure vehicles... turned over to the Israelis... who used a Jordanian...and Palestinian team... to murder a Lebanese militant in Damascus..., with the covert help of an Iranian dissident faction in Iran's upper echelons... to avenge an attack against Americans..., French and Israelis in the 1980s and 90s...., and ALL that scheming "was" designed to protect the Chief Operating Officer of the White House Murder Inc., Assef Shawkat, who murdered, Mr. Elie Hobeika in 01-24-02, Rafic Hariri on Feb-14th 2005, and a few others..., on direct orders from the White House and Tel Aviv, in order to serve PNAC designs....

Michael G. Vickers is a "Nuclear Gangster" and Murder is his MOTTO.

In the Pentagon's newly expanded Special Operations office, a suite of sterile gray cubicles of death, assassinations, destructions,demolitions, and murder in the name of the White House Murder Inc., the main focus of the PNAC killers who thrive on Political Assassinations since February 14th 1979, courtesy of BOB GATES and the old OSP on the "C" ring of the third floor, Assistant Secretary of Murder Assassinations of the Potomac boys and KILLER GOON, Michael G. Vickers is working to implement the U.S. military's highest-priority plan for PNAC : a global campaign to "take-over-the-world plan..." which has its roots dating back to the 70s....

The wide-ranging plan details the targeting of al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the world and explores how the United States should retaliate in case of another major terrorist attack. The most critical aspect of the plan, Vickers said in a recent interview, involves U.S. Special Operations forces working through foreign partners to uproot and fight Resistance helping the American Made al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the Fath-Al-Islam and many others.

Vickers's job also spans the modernization of nuclear forces for deterrence and retaliation, and the retooling of conventional forces to combat resistance helping the American Made al-Qaeda-affiliated networks -- a portfolio so expansive that he and PNAC Pentagon officials referred to his efforts as the "take-over-the-world plan," CIRCA, Kissinger 1971...

Vickers, a former Green Beret and CIA operative, was the principal strategist for the biggest covert program in CIA history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The movie "Charlie Wilson's War," released last weekend, portrays Vickers in that role, in which he directed an insurgent force of 150,000 Afghan fighters and controlled an annual budget of more than $2 billion in current dollars.

Today, as the top Pentagon adviser on PNAC strategy, Vickers exudes the same assurance about defeating Resistance/insurgents helping the American Made al-Qaeda-affiliated networks and groups as he did as a 31-year-old CIA paramilitary officer assigned to Afghanistan, where he convinced superiors that with the right strategy and weapons, the ragtag Afghan insurgents could win. "I am just as confident or more confident we can prevail in the war on terror," Vickers, 54, said in a recent interview, looking cerebral behind thick glasses but with an energy and build reminiscent of the high school quarterback he once was. "Not a lot of people thought we could drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan..., but my buddy BOB Gates helped in earnest with the assassination by CIA, of our Ambassador to Kabul "Spike" ....on February 14th 1978...precipitating the invasion of Afghanistan by the CCCP, a copy cat operation repeated in 1989 by pushing Saddam Hussein into Kuwait, c/o April Glaspie...., and the copy cat operation of eliminating Hariri in a relatively "cheap" operation...which catapulted the Syrian Army back home into Syria, with their tale between their legs..., compared to Afghanistan's 10 year insurgency...which threw the Soviet Army out...onto a bridge crossing into central Asia shamelessly....courtesy of Vickers...and the Russians will not forget the Favors..."

Vickers joined the Pentagon in July to oversee the 54,000-strong Special Operations Command (Socom), based in Tampa, which is growing faster than any other part of the U.S. military. Socom's budget has doubled in recent years, to $6 billion for 2008, and the command is to add 13,000 troops to its ranks by 2011.

Senior Pentagon and military officials regard Vickers as a rarity -- a skilled strategist who is both creative and pragmatic. "He tends to think like a gangster," said Jim Thomas, a former senior defense planner who worked with Vickers. "He can understand trends then change the rules of the game so they are advantageous for your side."

Vickers's outlook was shaped in the CIA and Special Forces, which he joined off the street through a "direct enlistment" program in 1973. In the 10th Special Forces Group, he trained year-round for a guerrilla war against the Soviet Union. One scenario he prepared for: to parachute into enemy territory with a small nuclear weapon strapped to his leg, and then position it to halt the Red Army.

Vickers recalled that the nuclear devices did not seem that small, "particularly when you are in an aircraft with one of them or it is attached to your body." Was it a suicide mission? "I certainly hoped not," Vickers said.

An expert in martial arts, parachuting and weapons, and second in his class at Officer Candidate School, Vickers was also fluent in Czech and Spanish, which made him overqualified when he joined the CIA's paramilitary unit in 1983. Soon after, he received a citation for combat in Grenada.....

But Vickers's greatest influence was in the clinically precise way he reassessed the potential of Afghan guerrilla forces and prescribed the right mix of weaponry to attack Soviet weaknesses. This brash plan to create a force of "techno-guerrillas" able to fight year-round called for exponentially more money, which through sheer force of logic Vickers was able to obtain.

Today Vickers's plan to build a global counterterrorist network is no less ambitious. The plan is focused on a list of 20 "high-priority" countries, with Pakistan posing a central preoccupation for Vickers, who said al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the country's western tribal areas are a serious threat to the United States. The list also includes Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Yemen, Somalia and Iran, and Vickers hints that some European countries could be on it. Beyond that, the plan covers another 29 "priority" countries, as well as "other countries" that Vickers does not name....and I know every one of them... "It's not just the Middle East. It's not just the developing world. It's not just nondemocratic countries -- it's a global problem," he said. "Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it...."

The plan deploys a variety of elite killer assassins around the world, including about 80 to 90 12-man teams of Army Special Forces soldiers who are skilled in foreign languages and at working with indigenous forces. Today, those forces are heavily concentrated in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, but as their numbers grow, they will increase their presence in other countries....

"The war on terror is fundamentally an indirect war. . . It's a war of partners . . but it also is a bit of the war in the shadows, either because of political sensitivity or the problem of finding terrorists," Vickers said. "That's why the Central Intelligence Agency is so important . . . and our Special Operations forces play a large role."

Vickers is pressing Congress to double "train and equip" funding from levels approved in recent years for the military. The funds, which total $325 million for fiscal 2007, allow the U.S. military and Special Operations forces to pay indigenous fighters and paramilitaries who work with them in gathering intelligence, hunting terrorists, fomenting guerrilla warfare or putting down an insurgency.

The funds are "very important . . . so we can move rather rapidly to train and equip foreign security forces" and more will be needed, Vickers told senators at his confirmation hearing in July. "If you don't have close cooperation, you can't fight the war," he said later.

But while local forces can be far more effective in countering terrorism in their regions, creating the forces must be done carefully, said Thomas, the former defense planner. "The last thing we want to do is create a bunch of right-wing goon squads that go out and shoot jihadists with very little legitimacy."

Vickers is also arguing for billions of dollars in new technology: specialized stealthy aircraft able to fly over countries undetected, unmanned aerial vehicles and other equipment for distant and close-up surveillance, and technology to "tag" and "track" individuals and cars for long distances over time.

Finally, Vickers seeks authority for more flexible and rapid "detailing" that would allow Special Operations forces, in larger numbers, to be seconded to the CIA and allowed to work under agency rules.

"It's striking to see how quickly he moves through large amounts of information" and then gives guidance how to get things done, said Kalev Sepp, deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations, who works under Vickers. "He knows the key players on Capitol Hill. . . . He understands what level of general officer has to be contacted to make decisions," Sepp said.

But with just over one year left in the Bush administration, Vickers is impatient with bureaucratic infighting within the military and between the Pentagon and other agencies, current and former officials said. One official noted that it took Socom about three years to write the counterterrorism plan, and two years for the administration to approve a classified "execute order" against al-Qaeda.

Vickers, who has advised President Bush on Iraq strategy, is convinced that more U.S. troops are not enough to solve the conflict in Iraq and that working with local forces is the best long-term strategy for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Its imperative that the Iraqis provide . . . security, so transitioning to an indirect approach is critical," he said. "The surge has been phenomenally effective . . . but not sufficient," he said, adding that he thinks that without political change the effects of the troop buildup "will dissipate."

Working with proxy forces will also enable the United States to extend and sustain its influence, something it failed to do in Afghanistan, he said. "After this great victory and after a million Afghans died, we basically exited that region and Afghanistan just spun into chaos," he said.

"It's imperative that we not do that again," Michael G. Vickers says....?

Thursday, April 3, 2008

These Heroes are the better men...

War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things... The decayed and degraded state of mind that thinks nothing is worth fighting for is far worse. A man who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing he cares about more than his own personal safety is a miserable creature, who has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself...

These Heroes are the better men...

"Arma virumque cano" ... "Of arms and a man I sing" (from Virgil's "Aeneid", Book I) ... for countless generations to come, proud Lebanese will "sing" of the valiant service and ultimate sacrifice of Elie HOBEIKA, Dimitri Ajram, Fares Sweidan and Walid El-Zein. Let the names of these courageous soldiers be well remembered and revered for all time. DE OPPRESSO LIBER!

"No greater love has a man than to lay down his life for another" There is not a day that goes by that I don't think of all the heroes that have served our country, since 1968.... I am blessed because of their sacrifices.... I did have the honor of serving in our "forces" and because of an Oath I HK's graveside...., I cannot say anything of "where", "How and How Long" but I would trade places with any of these brave men so that they could be with their loved ones..., because I know the whole "truth" and bravery of HK and his comrades... It breaks my heart every time I hear another person losing his life..., resisting the Hegemonic designs of PNAC Murderers... While we sit at home, it's easy for people to forget what our brave heroes have done for us..., anonymously. I WILL NOT FORGET!

"To Love A Soldier".... To Love a Soldier Is to Become One Too. To have a Heart of Pride and Passion, A Desire to Kill Evil, Yet Love, Love Tenderly...... Let me in, For I am yours. You are my Soldier And I am yours..... I am a Soldier Of Love, Life and Peace. My Weapon is my Heart. I Fight for what I Love. I Love you, My Heroes, And it is you whom I will fight for..... They say I am Strong, They ask me how I survive, I say I hold my head up high And shed my tears at night..... With you my heroes I only feel Love and Power, You shield my heart with gold And it shines, Shines with Love and Courage..... I miss you. Come back to me, My Heroes, For I am yours And I am waiting......... -I dedicate this to all the brave men and women who are fighting on the front-lines of Lebanon....north to South, to mountains and plains...out there fighting for our freedom and to those lonely hearts waiting patiently for their loved one’s safe arrival....for their sacrifice will not go in vain...fighting the most evil alliance ever to exist on Planet Earth, the PNAC alliance of KILLERS, MURDERERS and ASSassins of USA, Damascus and Herzliah, of the White House Murder Inc.,

What we do is not who we are, but it becomes who we were... All these names of those who had tread the battlefield and now sing with the angels, and all those blessed with having known and loved them will be remembered for their strength and inspiration. Should this war need to trundle on, people like all of you and those for whom you mourn will burn in the fires of memory long after the last shots have rung.... I have lost dearly in this war, which started for me long before.... but the opportunity to have known them, and to the promise of seeing them in some future an outer world...., and for those lost opportunities, I remember...and always will.

The greatest love of all is to lay your life down for another. What more could you give? From many of us that understand to some degree what you faced, we say "thanks". You are the brightest, boldest, and best... MEN OF VALOR... "YOU HAVE DIED SERVING THOSE OPPRESSED" YOU TRULY ARE LEBANON'S BEST... in death you have brought others life and liberty. We salute you and honor your sacrifice.

To each one of you I bow on my face humbled by your loving sacrifice. Thank you now & thank you for my family & the generations that follow. Your love & life will never be forgotten for what you have given us. I know that God of this universe will honor you & your family & the future generations b/c of your gift, your life, that you were willing to lay at the alter for all of us. It is an honor to have known you... May God give you in heaven your great & deserved reward. Bless you, each one of you deeply.

Words cannot express the gratitude and respect I have for each of you. May God comfort, bless and keep your family and loved ones and may you rest eternally in His loving embrace, comforted in the truth that your ultimate sacrifice has ensured the safety of your countrymen and provided the first steps toward peace in such a troubled part of the world. Freedom Flies In Your Heart Like The Phoenix, Let It Soar With The Winds High Above, Among Spirits Of Resistance fighters Now Sleeping, Guard It With Care and With Love, and make the circles of PNAC's war, circles of Hell for the aggressors, and circles of Peace for our best and bravest...!!

I have dwelt on the deaths of these brave warriors in depth. Words can be difficult to express the deeply felt sorrow at the souls lost, lives not lived, loved ones never to be held again. These wonderful Lebanese men wore their nations honor - the Honor of the "Green Cedars" with distinction, with dignity, and most of all, with Valor. They honored us with their resistance, they humble us with their sacrifice, and they give every true-blooded Lebanese reason to pause - at great length - and reflect on just what it means to be a true Lebanese. They chose the most honorable of battles, in one of the most honorable of the honorable. The Resistance to oppression "family" is even better for having had these four warriors in their midst. The Resistance to oppression "family" is heavy of heart because of their passing. As a resistance veteran, as a daily fighter, investigator for 10 long years..., and as a proud Lebanese, I most humbly stand at attention and render the most sincere salute to these brave men, their unbreakable dedication to their steadfastness, in the face of utter oppression, lies, demagoguery, fabrications, dis-information, deceit , deception and psy-ops wars, for their nation, memory and soul... I salute them for all they were, all they stood for, and for their memory which will for always be a marked chapter in the history of free peoples all around the globe. January 24th, 2002 saw these men begin a journey that ended their lives in a split-second.... their blood has made sacred the soil upon which they last stood. That small part of this place we all call Earth is theirs and theirs alone. Bought and paid for with their very own blood. That place is forever sacred unto them. Let no man, let no woman who cherishes and enjoys the freedoms we Lebanese take for granted, ever take for granted the supreme sacrifice of Elie HOBEIKA, Dimitri Ajram, Fares Sweidan and Walid El-Zein. Four of the best of the best Lebanese ever had to offer. May God Grant each of you eternal Peace. And I shall remember you always...and allow none to forget you if within my power to do so .... AMEN.

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

Syria: After the Failed Summit, or before the summit, ... All Arab Summits are utter failures.

Syria: After the Failed Summit, or before the summit, ... All Arab Summits are utter failures.


If the criterion of success of Arab summits is merely seeing them held, then Damascus Summit was a distinct success. It was in fact convened despite all the controversy it stirred. If the achievement of the summit was to avoid any bickering or fighting among the participants, then the Damascus Summit received an A+ grade, after the Libyan leader, Moammar Gadhafi, provoked the awe of some participants with his tremendous courage, frankness, self-criticism and honesty.....never seen before by any Arab "leaders", while causing others to laugh.....for now. !

In any case, the Arab state system faces a big predicament and there is no room for deals among the players.

It seems like Iran was the winner at the Damascus Summit, which was confirmed by statements by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, from Damascus. This was after he attended the summit as a guest of honor. In these statements, he destroyed the Arabs' decision vis-à-vis the three UAE islands, asking the Arab League Secretary General to focus his efforts on the Palestinian issue.

Mottaki added a new predicament to the Arab list, especially since the summit's failure to solve the Lebanese crisis was added to the traditional failure to deal with the Palestinian issue, and the several failures to solve other Arab issues. This summit that convened in Damascus confirmed that the solutions to Arab problems could not come from fine words, smiles and feigned satisfaction in front of flash bulbs and cameras.

The Syrian-hosted Arab League summit that ended March 30 was a joke by any measure. In light of this joke, Damascus is working to blackmail USA, KSA and others some more, successfully... its regional isolation non-existant.... Most important to Syria will be getting regional Arab powers to take seriously the Syrian continued blackmail over Lebanon, Iraq, and more.... In its successful blackmail of USA's PNAC Killers, Damascus could turn on the heat in Lebanon, though ultimately this could backfire....., since the White House Murder Inc., has a subsidiary in to KILL there too...


No matter how Syria tries to spin it, the March 29-30 Arab League summit in Damascus was a JOKE. Twelve of the Arab League’s 22 heads of state — including the U.S.-lackeys rulers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon — failed to make an appearance, and the delegates that did show up were mired in a host of largely insignificant spats over the wording of the summit’s final statement.

Syria — which cares a great deal about its position in the Arab world — has been dealt the worst possible joke with this summit. It is now attempting to cope with its ever-apparent successful blackmail operation.

Damascus’ biggest worry is how to get the major Arab powers of the region to take seriously Syria’s hegemonic role in Lebanon, where Syrian geopolitical interests are rooted. Despite the waves of intimidation tactics and diplomatic maneuvers employed by the Syrians regarding Lebanon, the U.S-backed regimes in Beirut, Riyadh, Cairo — and to a lesser extent Amman — are refusing to yield to Syrian demands for a new Lebanese president amenable to Syrian interests, safeguards for Hezbollah and immunity for the Syrian government from an international tribunal on the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.

Syrian President Bashar al Assad has made some headway on the tribunal issue; the U.N. team investigating the assassination recently praised Syria for its cooperation and circumvented U.S. pressure to directly implicate the Syrian government by vaguely blaming the assassination on a “criminal network.” But he is still experiencing some indigestion in dealing with rifts that have erupted within the government involving Syrian military intelligence chief Asef Shawkat and his recent assassination of top Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah in Damascus....

With Syria backed into such a tight corner, it becomes all the more critical to consider Damascus’ moves in the wake of this summit... Desperate times call for desperate measures, and Stratfor is CIA dis-information, Texas funded and Texas based... CIA2 sources have long reported that Syria will step up its game in Lebanon if the summit were to succeed in blackmailing all PNAC stooges... The Syrian recipe for an uptick in chaos in Lebanon would involve a resumption of assassinations, courtesy of the White House Murder Inc,... targeting additional anti-Pnac Cabinet members to bring about the collapse of the Western-backed government led by Prime lackey Fouad Siniora. It also would involve instigating clashes between Islamist militant groups based out of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps to absorb the Lebanese military’s attention. Finally, it could involve sending jihadists transiting Syria, courtesy of Bandar Bin-Sultan who pays for that effort to Assef Shawkat since 03/2003...hundreds of Millions of USD... toward the Iraqi border in a signal to the United States that Syria cannot be entirely ignored in negotiations over PNAC,Iraq, CIA2 Documentary evidence of entrapments in the White House Murder Inc., etc etc..

But major complications are attached to this Syrian strategy. For one thing, Syria will have a hard time relying on its militant proxy Hezbollah for any bold actions it wants to take in Lebanon. Not only is there a great deal of distrust brewing between the Hezbollah leadership and Syria over the Mughniyah assassination, Hezbollah is taking an extremely cautious approach these days in planning any militant activity. The Shiite militant group and its Iranian patrons are well aware that Israel is building the case for another military confrontation in Lebanon. Though Hezbollah has been busy making preparations for another war, the group’s leaders know they will have a hard time claiming victory in a renewed conflict that could potentially undermine their credibility in the eyes of their southern Shiite support base — which would be on the receiving end of Israeli firepower.

Second, there is no guarantee that a more aggressive Syrian approach in Lebanon would result in a capitulation by the Siniora government to Syrian demands, particularly with the United States, France and the Western-backed Arab governments leaning heavily on the Siniora Cabinet to stand down in spite of the country’s faltering economy caused by the political crisis. A revitalized Syrian intimidation campaign could very well backfire and crush opposition to Syria’s desired role in Lebanon, but with nowhere else to turn, these age-old tactics may be all that Damascus has to turn to....since they always work with USA's PNAC band of criminals , murderers, and Killer assassins, who have relied for so long on Syria's killer subsidiary of the White House Murder Inc., hence Syria has some pretty damning evidence to submit to the Hague....about complicity in the White House Murder Inc., of the KILLERS on the Potomac and Herzliah...